The Palestinian Authority was supposed to govern after 2005. Look how that worked out.
I visited Israel in late August 2005. It was a hot summer, and the political turmoil of the day made it hotter still. The Jewish state was in the throes of one of its more tortured sagas: the self-imposed and forced removal of its citizens from the Gaza Strip.
The country was bitterly divided, not for the first or last time. The government of Prime Minister Ariel Sharon had lost its majority and the confidence of his Likud Party’s rank-and-file. Forming a new party, Kadima, he joined with dovish opposition leader Shimon Peres and secured the required support for his “disengagement plan.” Among the plan’s opponents was then-Finance Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who resigned from the government after his demand for a national referendum went unmet.
Mr. Netanyahu is now the prime minister tasked with responding to the most devastating terrorist attack in Israel’s history, which Hamas launched from the territory Israel vacated in 2005. On Monday Mr. Netanyahu returned to the question of Gaza’s governance. His remarks came as the Israel Defense Forces moved to reclaim control of the strip from Hamas, pushing deep into the 140-square-mile territory. Israeli forces have cut the north from the south and encircled Gaza City, and are closing in on the command base at Shifa hospital, where they believe Hamas leadership is bunkered.
“I think Israel will, for an indefinite period, have the overall security responsibility, because we’ve seen what happens when we don’t,” Mr. Netanyahu told ABC News.
U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken shot back on Wednesday. There should be “no reoccupation of Gaza after the conflict ends,” he said, speaking from the Group of Seven summit in Japan. Other conditions, he said, include no “attempt to blockade or besiege Gaza” and no “reduction of the territory of Gaza.” Last week Mr. Blinken told the Senate Appropriations Committee of his hopes for a “revitalized” Palestinian Authority governing Gaza after Israel concludes its military campaign.
For the Israelis, this is déjà vu. The Palestinian Authority assumed control after the 2005 pullout, only to be ousted in a violent coup by Hamas two years later. The Israelis can’t be asked to roll the dice again. The Gaza exit failed to deliver either the public-relations or national-security benefits that its proponents promised in 2005. Instead the strip became a launchpad for death and destruction. There’s no reason to believe a do-over would produce different or better results.
Mr. Netanyahu has long been skeptical of vacating land that could be seized by terrorists. In his 1995 book, “Fighting Terrorism,” he notes that terror organizations such as Hamas are at their deadliest when they are “exceptionally well trained,” are “well funded and equipped,” and occupy a “safe haven.” Three of Israel’s borders—with Lebanon, Syria and Gaza—are now controlled by terror ministates wherein each of these conditions are amply met. In the case of Gaza and southern Lebanon, terrorists have flourished in territories the IDF once controlled.
After the Oct. 7 attack, which many Israelis now refer to as the “Black Sabbath,” a video from 2005 began circulating on social-media channels. In it, Sodi Namir—a physician from Neve Dekalim, a former Israeli settlement in Gaza—is seen raging as he’s dragged by IDF soldiers executing the disengagement. “A million murders will come,” he bellows. “Rockets on Ashkelon. Mortars on Sderot. Murders in Netivot. You are all partners in this crime. Nothing will stop it. This is exactly what will happen. All headlines will be disasters.” To Israelis, the words now ring prophetic.
Gazans have also been devastated by the 2005 pullout. Hamas has led them to five wars against their far stronger neighbor. It has plundered nearly every resource of the coastal enclave. Gaza’s hospitals house Hamas military bases. Its schools are indoctrination and recruitment centers. Its playgrounds are missile launchpads. Its children are human shields. When Israel administered Gaza in the 1970s, by contrast, its economy grew at a compound annual rate of 8.5%, according to a 2013 analysis by Netanya Academic College economist Andrew Schein.
At the G-7 parlay on Wednesday, British Foreign Minister James Cleverly added that he’d like to see control of Gaza handed to “a peace-loving Palestinian leadership.” The idea, for now, is a fantasy. After a generation of indoctrination, it will take decades to reverse the culture of hate that Hamas and the Palestinian Authority have meticulously cultivated.
It’s time the international community recognizes what many Israelis and some Gazans have already learned. For the foreseeable future, Israeli control of Gaza will bring the best possible outcome for the beleaguered civilian populations of the region—both Arab and Israeli.
Mr. Efune is publisher of the New York Sun.
I visited Israel in late August 2005. It was a hot summer, and the political turmoil of the day made it hotter still. The Jewish state was in the throes of one of its more tortured sagas: the self-imposed and forced removal of its citizens from the Gaza Strip.
The country was bitterly divided, not for the first or last time. The government of Prime Minister Ariel Sharon had lost its majority and the confidence of his Likud Party’s rank-and-file. Forming a new party, Kadima, he joined with dovish opposition leader Shimon Peres and secured the required support for his “disengagement plan.” Among the plan’s opponents was then-Finance Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who resigned from the government after his demand for a national referendum went unmet.
Mr. Netanyahu is now the prime minister tasked with responding to the most devastating terrorist attack in Israel’s history, which Hamas launched from the territory Israel vacated in 2005. On Monday Mr. Netanyahu returned to the question of Gaza’s governance. His remarks came as the Israel Defense Forces moved to reclaim control of the strip from Hamas, pushing deep into the 140-square-mile territory. Israeli forces have cut the north from the south and encircled Gaza City, and are closing in on the command base at Shifa hospital, where they believe Hamas leadership is bunkered.
“I think Israel will, for an indefinite period, have the overall security responsibility, because we’ve seen what happens when we don’t,” Mr. Netanyahu told ABC News.
U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken shot back on Wednesday. There should be “no reoccupation of Gaza after the conflict ends,” he said, speaking from the Group of Seven summit in Japan. Other conditions, he said, include no “attempt to blockade or besiege Gaza” and no “reduction of the territory of Gaza.” Last week Mr. Blinken told the Senate Appropriations Committee of his hopes for a “revitalized” Palestinian Authority governing Gaza after Israel concludes its military campaign.
For the Israelis, this is déjà vu. The Palestinian Authority assumed control after the 2005 pullout, only to be ousted in a violent coup by Hamas two years later. The Israelis can’t be asked to roll the dice again. The Gaza exit failed to deliver either the public-relations or national-security benefits that its proponents promised in 2005. Instead the strip became a launchpad for death and destruction. There’s no reason to believe a do-over would produce different or better results.
Mr. Netanyahu has long been skeptical of vacating land that could be seized by terrorists. In his 1995 book, “Fighting Terrorism,” he notes that terror organizations such as Hamas are at their deadliest when they are “exceptionally well trained,” are “well funded and equipped,” and occupy a “safe haven.” Three of Israel’s borders—with Lebanon, Syria and Gaza—are now controlled by terror ministates wherein each of these conditions are amply met. In the case of Gaza and southern Lebanon, terrorists have flourished in territories the IDF once controlled.
After the Oct. 7 attack, which many Israelis now refer to as the “Black Sabbath,” a video from 2005 began circulating on social-media channels. In it, Sodi Namir—a physician from Neve Dekalim, a former Israeli settlement in Gaza—is seen raging as he’s dragged by IDF soldiers executing the disengagement. “A million murders will come,” he bellows. “Rockets on Ashkelon. Mortars on Sderot. Murders in Netivot. You are all partners in this crime. Nothing will stop it. This is exactly what will happen. All headlines will be disasters.” To Israelis, the words now ring prophetic.
Gazans have also been devastated by the 2005 pullout. Hamas has led them to five wars against their far stronger neighbor. It has plundered nearly every resource of the coastal enclave. Gaza’s hospitals house Hamas military bases. Its schools are indoctrination and recruitment centers. Its playgrounds are missile launchpads. Its children are human shields. When Israel administered Gaza in the 1970s, by contrast, its economy grew at a compound annual rate of 8.5%, according to a 2013 analysis by Netanya Academic College economist Andrew Schein.
At the G-7 parlay on Wednesday, British Foreign Minister James Cleverly added that he’d like to see control of Gaza handed to “a peace-loving Palestinian leadership.” The idea, for now, is a fantasy. After a generation of indoctrination, it will take decades to reverse the culture of hate that Hamas and the Palestinian Authority have meticulously cultivated.
It’s time the international community recognizes what many Israelis and some Gazans have already learned. For the foreseeable future, Israeli control of Gaza will bring the best possible outcome for the beleaguered civilian populations of the region—both Arab and Israeli.
Mr. Efune is publisher of the New York Sun.
